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The Big Mac Attack: A Critical Affirmation of MacKinnon's 
Unmodified Theory of Patriarchal Power 
Alexandra Z. Dobrowolsky · & Richard F. Devlin·· 
Introduction 
For several years now, Catharine MacKinnon has impressed and inspired 
us in that she has consistently and eloquently articulated much of what we felt 
and feared: that the condition of women in North American society is intoler­
able; that the state, because of its acts and omissions, is complicitous in the 
enforced inequality of women; and that law, more often than not, has been part 
of the problem rather th.an part of the solution. However, despite our broad 
agreement with the general direction of MacKinnon 's analysis throughout this 
period, we each have had, in our own different ways, a sense of discomfort, an 
inchoate feeling that something was amiss. Yet, we found it difficult to focus 
and express this dis-ease. 1ben, as we, from our diverse perspectives, discussed 
MacKinnon's most recent book, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State1 we 
began to come to terms with our disquiet, to identify, define and delineate our 
concerns. The result of these conversations is this collaborative essay which, in 
the words of Cornell West and bell hooks, aspires to be a "critical affirmation"2 
of MacKinnon 's enterprise. 
• Feminist Activist. M.A. Political Theory, Dalhousie University 
•• Associate Professor of Law, University of Calgary. 
IO McGill Law Journal 1991 
Revue de droit de McGill 
1Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989. 
2See b. hooks. "Black Women and Men: Partnership in the l 990's" in b. hooks, Yearning: Race, 
Gender, and Cultural Polirics (Bos ton: South End Press, 1990) 203 at 208 & 213 [hereinafter 
Yearning]. hooks captures the key elements of this seemingly oxymoronic concept of critical affir­
mation in the following way: 
[W]e educate one another to acquire critical consciousness. we have the chance to see 
how important airing diverse perspectives can be for any progressive political struggle 
that is serious about �formatio11- F.ngaging in intellectual exchange whae people 
hear a diversity of viewpoints enables them to witness first hand solidarity that grows 
stronga in a context of productive critical exchange and confrontation ("Liberation 
Scenes: speak this yearning" in supra, 1 at 6). 
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Our note consists of four parts. Pan I .  presents a brief introduction to the 
main elements and themes of MacKinnon 's argument, particularly as they are 
synthesized and developed in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Part II 
engages in a critique of what we consider to be the simultaneously under and 
over-inclusive nature of MacKinnon's theory and tentatively offers some reme­
dial suggestions. 1brough an analysis of MacK.innon's conception of conscious­
ness raising, Part III highlights an internal incoherence that exemplifies the 
problems we identify in Part II. Finally, Part IV, in the spirit of contextualism, 
sheds some further light on the perspectives which lay the foundations for our 
concerns. 
I. MacKinnon 's Project 
In writing the book. Toward A Feminist Theory of the State, Catharine 
MacK.innon sets herself a daunting task: to formulate a feminist theory of 
power. power that is omnipotent and omnipresent; power that fuels law, state 
and society as we know it; power that is, simply and overwhelmingly. male 
power. In her preface, MacK.innon 's aim is starkly and boldly stated. She writes, 
this book "is about what is, the meaning of what is, and the way what is, is 
enforced. "3 For MacKinnon, "what is" is a society constituted and scarred by 
male domination and female subordination through sexuality and gender. This 
situation is sanctioned and promoted by both state and laws as they legitimate 
and disseminate male power. 
The book is a response to what MacKinnon suggests is feminism's failµre 
to articulate a theory of socio-politico-legal power. To say that hers is an ambi­
tious endeavour is an understatement. MacKinnon deserves admiration and 
respect for taking on this formidable responsibility which can be seen as both 
onerous and potentially inspiring, especially given that the final product is per­
spicacious, impressive and praiseworthy. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 
is a book full of valuable MacK.innonesque insights and analyses. The author 
has an enviable writing style,4 one that combines rigorous evaluation with biting 
irony, caustic cynicism and a healthy disrespect for the academic enterprise. By 
and large, MacKinnon's themes are well developed and integrated and her 
reconceptionalizations and recategorizations of old debates are particularly illu­
minating. The result is compelling reading and innovative arguments that paint 
a grim picture of an inequitable, unjust society in which male dominance is 
institutionalized and female inequality is entrenched. Toward a Feminist Theory 
of the State will never allow readers to think about the world in quite the same 
way again. It is, in itself, a mode of consciousness raising. 
3Supra, note 1 at xii. 
'We have quoted extensively from MacKinnon 's text for two reasons. First. MacKinnon 's phra­
seology is difficuh to improve upon. indeed alm�t addictive. Second, given that we offer a critique 
of her work, we want to ensure absolute accuracy. 
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It is. of course, impossible to do justice to the depth and sophistication of 
MacKinnon 's analysis in a note_ Therefore. in this part, we shall briefly high­
light what we consider to be some of the crucial elements of her argument, con­
centrating on those which we will further pursue in Parts m and N. 
Toward A Feminist Theory of the State is divided into three sections which 
correspond to MacK.innon 's three central inquiries into I) Feminism and Marx­
ism, ID Method, and III) The State (and Law). The sections are interrelated. and 
each section works as a building block to the next. 
In section I, MacK.innon addresses the problem of marxism and feminism 
through commentary on Marx and Engels, through what she calls a marxist cri­
tique of feminism and throu� an examination of attempts at synthesizing the 
two. According to MacKinnon, marxism and feminism are both theories of 
power, but the two have separate histories, and that which is pivotal to the 
former, work, is distinct from that which is fundamental to the latter, sexuality. 
As a consequence of these differences, marx.ism initially did not adequately 
address feminist concerns. Later efforts at syn.thesis were not successful and, 
MacKinnon argues, will never be successful if they continue to ignore the cen­
trality of sexual violence perpetrated by men against women. 1be only approach 
that has come close is that of the "wages for housework" theory but close only 
counts in horseshoes, and so even this does not go far enough for MacKinnon. 
Significantly, chapter three's title, .. A Marxist Critique of Feminism," is 
misleading, given its actual content. The chapter does not venture into the intri­
cacies of marxist philosophy in an attempt to study the marxist interpretation of 
feminism. Rather, it largely pertains to MacKinnon 's criticism of what, ostensi­
bly, appears to be classical, liberal feminism beginning with John Stuart Mill, 
and then the chapter develops into an appraisal of various feminists from 
Simone de Beauvoir and Carol Gilligan to Nancy Chodorow and Susan Brown­
miller. Chapter three, therefore, contains important insights into MacK.innon ·s 
philosophical stance which we shall return to later. 
The second section, Method, presents the crux of MacKinnon's meaning­
ful, thought-provoking, and controversial theorizing. This section moves from 
a discussion of consciousness raising, to an adumbration of MacKinnon 's fem­
inist project with her views on power and her analysis of sexuality. 
Through the process of consciousness raising, MacKinnon explains that 
women move beyond ideas to practice by obtaining .. a lived knowing of the 
social reality of being female."5 For MacKinnon, race. class. and or physiology 
may define one woman from another, but, nevertheless, 0simply being a woman 
has a meaning that decisively defines all women socially, from their most inti­
mate moments to their most anonymous relations. "6 The crucial realizations 
5Supra. note 1 at 90. 
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emerging from consciousness raising, in MacK.innon 's estimation. are that men 
possess the power to dominate women. or to choose not to and that they as a 
group benefit from women's subordmation. 7 
In Chapters 6 and 7, MacK.innon addresses what she terms feminist method 
as she deals with the issues of power and sexuality. These discussions. we sug­
gest, lie at the heart of her theory and are pivotal to an understanding of her 
analysis. She writes: 
Feminism has a theory of power: sexuality is gendered as gender is sexualized. 
Male and female are created through the eroticization of dominance and submis­
sion. The man/Woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define 
each other. This is the social meaning of sex and the distinctively feminist account 
of gender inequality. Sexual objectification, the central process within this 
dynamic is at once epistemological and political. 8 
MacK.innon offers a three-step, cumulative analysis. First and foremost, male 
power is fundamental. Viewed from this vantage point, sexuality must be under­
stood as neither natural, nor biological, but as a social construct of male power.9 
Third, gender as a social consnuction is forged and formatted by this hierarchi­
calized sexuality. Thus, gender relates backward to sexuality and then to 
power. 10 As an illustration, MacKinnon lists a series of stereotypically female 
personality.traits and traces them back to sexuality. For instance, female passiv­
ity and frailty translate into women's inability to resist sexual advances,11 which 
structurally and ideologically dovetail with male desire to control and have 
access to women. She encapsulates her theory in these terms: .. Male dominance 
is sexual .. Meaning: men in particular, if not men alone, sexualize hierarchy; 
gender is one. "12 Mac Kinnon contends that this feminist theory of sexuality 
becomes its theory of politics. 13 She writes: 
what is called sexuality is the dynamic of control by which male dominance -
in forms that range from intimate to institutional, from a look to a rape - erot­
icizes and thus defines man and woman, gender identity and sexual pleasure_ It is 
also that which maintains and defines male supremacy as a political system.14 
In the final section of the book, 1be State, MacKinnon applies and concret -
izes her theory by means of an analysis of the patriarchal liberal state, and hones 
in on the issues of rape, abortion and pornography. Her penultimate chapter 
6/bid. 
1/bid. at 93-94. 
1/bid_ at 113-14-
9/bid. at 128. 
10/bid. at 113. 
11/bid. at 110. 
12/bid. at 127. 
13 Jbid. at 13 J. 
14/bid. at 137. 
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responds to the difference/dominance debate. The book closes with MacIGn­
non 's articulation of the premises and ambitions of a radical feminist jurispru­
dence, that is, feminism unmodified. 
MacKinnon claims that feminism has not confronted the problem of the 
liberal state. She argues that the state must be seen for what it is, "male juris­
prudentially, meaning that it adopts the standpoint of male power on the relation 
between law and society. "15 MacKinnon leaves no measure of doubt when she 
writes that the liberal state "is not autonomous of sex. Male power is systemic. 
Coercive, legitimated, epistemic. it is the regime. "16 Mac Kinnon discusses rape, 
abortion and pornography, in terms of her feminist method. Accordingly, laws 
relating to all these issues are seen, formally and substantively, as embodiments 
of the male standpoint. MacKinnon suggests that the law of rape, "divides 
women into spheres of consent according to indices of relationsbip to men ... 
Daughters may not consent; wives and prostitutes are assumed to, and cannot 
but."17 However, when further unpacked, the discourse of consent is revealed as 
ideological obfuscation because "men are systematically conditioned not even 
to notice what women want."18 Moreover, the crime of rape is defined and adju­
dicated from the male point of view and, she argues, this results in a legal deter­
mination of "whether or not a rape occurred from the rapists' perspective. "19 
Toe alternative, according to MacKinnon, is the feminist interpretation of rape 
which sees rape not as an act of violence but as an ··act of subordination of 
women to men. It expresses and reinforces women's inequality to men."20 
Similarly, abortion policy has never seriously included the woman's per­
spective. MacKinnon illustrates how women were granted the abortion right as 
a "private privilege, not as a public right.'-21 The American law on abortion 
embraces the public/private dichotomy as it frames abortion rights in terms of 
privacy. MacK.innon determines that abortion rights articulated in terms of pri­
vacy work against women, pitting individual women against women's collective 
needs, and thus do more harm than good. 22 She brings her argument full circle 
by delineating how the law of abortion encapsulates the male construction of 
sexuality: 
The abortion right frames the way in which men arrange among themselves to 
control the reproductive consequences of intercourse. 1be availability of an abor­
tio� enhances the availability of intcn:ourse.23 
15/bid. at 163. 
16/bid. at 170. 
11/bid. at 175. 
18/bid. at 181. 
19/bid. at 244. 
'1Dfbid. at 182. 
21/bid. at 192. 
22/bid. at 187-88. 
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MacK.innon ·s unmodified feminist analysis would relate the issue of reproduc­
tive control to the broader context of women's unequal sexual, social, economic 
and political condition. 
Pornography provides the most graphic substantiation of MacKinnon 's 
method. For MacKinnon, the laws which regulate pornography obscure more 
than they reveal because through the moralistic prism of "obscenity" they 
abstract from the realities of male power and thus work as a liberal, legal guise 
to preserve male supremacy.2' In MacKinnon 's assessment, the ubiquity of por­
nography proves that "[s]exual terrorism has become democratized."25 As with 
her analysis of rape, MacKinnon disputes the reduction of pornography to vip­
lence. 26 She feels that calling pornography violence hides the specificity of 
women's viewpoint, and "not" only abstracts from women's experience; it lies 
aoout it. ',z, She succinctly sums up her objection to equating rape and pornog­
raphy with violence with her statement: 
As with rape, where the issue is not the presence or absence of force but what sex 
is as distinct from coercion, the question for pornography is what eroticism is dis­
tinct from the subordination of women. llris is not a rhetorical question. Under 
male dominance, whatever sexually arouses a man is sex. In pornography, the vio­
lence is the sex. 28 
Chapter 12, the penultimate chapter, addresses the issue of sameness and 
difference. Moral theory and laws on sexual discrimination often consider 
equality and gender issues in terms of either sameness or difference. For 
MacKinnon, this practice "covers up the reality of gender as a system of social 
hierarchy. "29 Ultimately, both the sameness and the difference paths lead to 
dead-ends. With sameness, women are encouraged to be the same as men. In 
law, this means that women are formally granted access to what men have 
through approaches like "gender neutrality. "30 With difference, women are 
encouraged to be different from men and to value what they are, or have been 
constructed as, distinctive as women. In law, this is doctrinally encoded as the 
"special protection rule."31 In both, women must measure up to the male stand­ard, either in their proximity to it, or their distance from it. 
Z3fbid. 
24/bid. at 195. 
13/bid. at 201. 
� is not the same as saying there is no connection between pornography and violence. 
Indeed, drawing on laboratory research, MacKinnon argues that there is a causal connection 
between pornography and violence against women. /bid. at 196. 
27/bid. at 211. 
28/bid. 
'29fbid. at 218. 
'31Jlbid. at 220-21. 
31fbid. 
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For MacK.innon, the rubric of difference is especially problematic as it 
becomes a "double standard [that] does not give women the dignity of the single 
standard. "32 Women are stigmatized as different and " [ m ]a.king exceptions for 
women, as if they are a special case, often seems preferable to correcting the 
rule itself. '133 For instance, women have not been allowed employment in male 
prisons due to their "womanhood," i.e. due to their rapability, and yet, the "con­
ditions that create women's rapability are not seen as susceptible to legal 
change. "34 Hence, neither sameness nor difference constitute real progress for 
women as the: 
[G]ender-neutral approach to sex discrimination law obscures, and the protection­
ist rationale declines to change, the fact that women's poverty and consequent 
financial dependence on men .... forced motherhood, and sexual vulnerability sub­
stantive ly constitute their social status as women. 35 
The way out, according to MacKinnon, is to conceive of the problem in terms 
of gender hierarchy, and to see that the "sexes are equally different but not 
equally powerful. "36 
These arguments are brought together in the final chapter which adum­
brates her conception of feminist jurisprudence. Here, MacK.innon continues her 
scathing analysis of law as she writes: 
In liberal regimes, law is a particularly potent soun:e and badge of l egitimacy, and 
site and cloak of force. The force underpins the legitimacy as the legitimacy con­
ceals the force. When life becomes law in such a system, the transformation is 
both formal and substantive. It reenter s  life marlc:ed by power ... Liberal legalism 
is ... a medium for making male- dominance both invisib le and legitimate by 
adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view 
• 37 on society. 
In particular, she argues that liberal legalism's central legitimizations - objec­
tivity and neutrality - are always and already encoded with the male point of 
view. Consequently, they are liberal legalism 's most significant political, i.e. 
male supremacist, achievement because the espousal of objectivity and neutral­
ity render male domination most invisible, most natural, most taken for granted, 
and therefore most powerful. 
However, all is not negation and MacKinnon 's vision of escape from this 
state, her envisaged reconstitution of the relationship between life and law, is 
that of feminism unmodified, her methodologically postmarxist feminism. 33 To 
32/bid. at 225. 
33 Ibid. at 226. 
'.Wfbid. 
35 Ibid. at 228. 
36/bid. at 232. 
37/bid. at 237 . 
33 Ibid. at 24 l .  
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elaborate, her plan is to take adyantage of the "crack"39 provided by liberal, 
legal guarantees of equality,40 and, rather than applying sameness and difference 
strategies, widen the gap by applying her dominance/subordination analysis. 
Consciousness raising in the seventies uncovered the problem of sex equality 
and now there is a need to apply this analysis to law41 The first stage is an 
acceptance of the reality of women with respect to sexual inequality, as they 
experience it. The second stage is a recognition "that male forms of power over 
women are affirmatively embodied as individual rights in law. "42 Issues such as 
rape, reproductive rights and pornography can then be reassessed in light of the 
sex equality as anti-domination perspective,43 rather than from the standpoint of, 
for example, the "reasonable rapist. "44 Consequently, the question of whether 
statutes are gender neutral or �x-specific would no longer be central. Instead, 
the significant queries would be: "[D]oes a practice participate in the subordi­
nation of women to men ... ? [Do statutes] work to end or reinforce male suprem­
acy .. . [And, are] they concretely grm.mded in women's experience of subordi­
nation or not[?]'"'s These procedures would help to bring about the changes 
MacK.innon strives for, but can barely imagine, in law and life: law that does 
not dominate life and a society in which men do not dominate women. 46 
II. Finely Focused Feminism: The Dilemma of Under and Over- Inclusion 
As this synopsis indicates, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State is an 
important, inspiring book. thick with significance, and radiating with reflections 
that have obviously been through the eighteen year gestation of which MacKin­
non speaks. However, in our opinion, there are some serious problems with 
MacK.innon's ambitious work. lbese stem, largely, from the fact that she takes 
it a step too far, her aspirations become too great, her project too large. Rather 
than building a feminist theory of the state, MacKinnon will not settle for any­
thing less than constructing the feminist theory, the one and only feminist 
framework through which to view our contemporary condition. Her theory 
comes dangerously close to totalization, for she grows categorical in her meth­
odology, definitive in her analysis and condemnatory in her critiques. As a con­
sequence, we suggest that her theory becomes both under and over-inclusive. 
By under-inclusive we mean that too much is left unsaid in terms of other fem­
inist theories. By over-inclusive we mean that too much is also left unexplained 
in terms of MacK.innon's own theory. Specifically, we posit that she has an 
39/bid. at 244. 
"°Ibid. at 242. 
41/bid. at 244. 
42/bid 
�Ibid. at 245-67. 
44/bid. at I 82. 
4Slbid. at 248. 
46/bid. at 249. 
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excessively broad conception of power, while her prescriptions for a mode of 
change are curiously sanguine and, we fear, fundamentally ambiguous. 
A. Prob/.ems of Under-Inclusion 
To begin with, there is a disturbing strain of orthodoxy within the book. 
Though it is true that every political activist and academic believes in the cor­
rectness of their analysis, and indeed that as an audience we expect conviction, 
MacK.innon 's analysis, at times, seems to go beyond this. It is not just that 
marxism, liberalism, liberal feminism, socialist feminism, feminist liberationists 
and critical legal studies are left in the dust of an unmodified feminism, rather 
it is the sense that there is one, and only one , acceptable analysis. There is no 
hint that an intellectual enterprise may require an element of corrigibility. For 
example, referring to previously published versions of sections of the book, she 
says that this "gave me the benefit of the misunderstandings. distortions. and 
misreadings of a wide readership.'"' As we read this, the mistakes lie with all 
others. while MacKinnon 's analysis, emphasis, and communicative skills have 
been exact from day one, no modification has been required. simply the elab­
oration of "a sustained theoretical argument.'"" And yet, we see inconsistencies 
in her work. For example, if we address the politics of language, MacKinnon 
castigates male discourse for using terminology like ''penetrate,"'41} and yet. she, 
curiously, adopts both "penetrate"50 and "interpenetrate. "51 Moreover, there are times when one gets the impression that almost no one else counts, for despite 
her acknowledgements/2 the "collaborative intellectual odyssey" has been with 
her "previous selves."53 
Some may counter that the above is a reflection of MacKinnon 's assertive, 
assured style more than her substance, but, on our reading, there is no doubt of 
her singularity of purpose. MacKinnon ?s stated ambition for the book is the cre­
ation of an "epic theory" along the lines of Sheldon Wolin, one that provides "a 
symbolic picture of an ordered whole," that is "systematically deranged," a the­ory that "attempts to change the world itself. "54 This begs the question, what 
does MacKinnon mean by theory, and, in light of her condemnation of others, 
we wonder whether there is an unconscious assumption that epic theory occu­
pies the field, all others being mere pretenders? 
'1 fbid. at xi. 
48/bid. at ix. 
49/bid. at 273, n. 27. 
50/bid. at 125 . 
51/bid. at 290. 
52/bid. at xvi-xvii. 
53/bid. at ix. 
54/bid. at x-xi. MacKinnon cites S. Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation� (1967) 63 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 1079. 
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In Mac Kinnon 's hands, the pursuit of the ordered whole takes its form 
through the analysis of male power. 1be consequence is that other power rela­
tions are structurally, though not necessarily intentionally. reduced to second 
order issues. In the preface, MacKinnon speaks to this issue, but, in our opinion, 
only superficially, through the technique of confession and avoidance. She 
admits that the book, "does not try to explain everything" and argues that, "[t]o 
look for the place of gender in everything is not to reduce everything to gen­
der:•ss Still, the best that she can offer is that she "does not pretend to present 
an even incipiently adequate analysis of race and sex, far less of race, sex, and 
class. That further work .. . will take at least another eighteen years. "S6 It is true 
that one cannot argue everything at once. However, perhaps it is also true that 
the nature of power relations in modem society are such that they cannot be cap­
tured in a holistic epic theory� that the axes of power intersect, intertwine, cross-­
fertilize, are mutually complementary as well as perhaps being. paradoxically. 
mutually undermining_s7 Thus. an explanatorily more thorough methodological 
approach may be one that is significantly more contextual,51 historically sensi­
tive, localized and diversified.S9 In this way, we might gain a more comprehen­
sive understanding of the interlocking relations between race, class and gender'° 
rather than structurally priorizing one (which. as we shall see later, seems to 
suggest something MacKinnon censures, a "women's unity"61 based on power-
sslbid. at xi. 
56lbid. at xii. 
57 E.g., bell hooks describes the current condition as a "white supremacist capitalist patriarchy" 
('Third World Diva Girls: politics of feminist solidarity" in Yearning. supra, note 2, 89 at 92). For 
a more sustained discussion of the non isolatable nature of the grids of power see E. Spelman, Ines­
sential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988). 
53Co�ider. e.g. the narrative style that has been adopted by many people of colour. See, for 
example, P. Monture, "Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah" (1986) 2 CJ.W.L 159: D. 
Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1987): 
KL Scheppele. "Foreward: Telling Stories" (1989) 87 Mich. L Rev. 2073 at 2073-94. Another 
example might be that of Foucault's genealogical method. See, for example, M. Foucault, "Nicus­
che, Genealogy, History" in P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucaull Reader (New Yolk: Pantheon, 1984). 
S9E.g., bell hooks writes that the "ideal situation for learning is always one where there is diver­
sity and dialogue" ("feminist scholarship: ethical issues" in Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, 
Thinking Black (Boston: South End Press, 1989) [hereinafter Talking Back] 42 at 47). Both of these 
elements do not seem to be accorded a significantly high priority within MacKinnon's scheme of 
things. 
"°''Critical Interrogation: talking race, resisting racism" in Yearning. supra, note 2, 51  at 59 & 
62. 
61Supra, note 1 at 5. 
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lessness) and puning others on hold.62 By extension, such an inquiry would have 
crucial ramifications on any proposed reconstructive agenda 63 
In the actual text, MacKinnon appears less guarded in her conception of the 
relationship between sex and the other axes of power. She claims, .. [f]emioism 
is the first theory to emerge from those whose interest it affirms ... 64 This may 
or may not be true,65 but to simply assert it without reference to, for instance, 
nationalist theories that reject imperialism. or work by people of colour combat­
ting racism, seems just a little too quick and easy_ 66 Or again, in discussing the 
viability of a socialist feminist jurisprudence, she asserts that the .. woman ques­
tion" is "the question,"67 clearly ranking gender over class. 1bis reductionism in 
the body of the text gives us the impression that the preface was written after 
the circulation and publication of some recent critiques of her work, 61 without 
fully grasping that their analyses may require a significant rethinking of some 
of her key assumptions. Such a reconsideration cannot be achieved by means of 
a few brief comments and the promise of subsequent inquiry_ 
62£.g., we are W1Sure how MacKinnon's analysis could even approximately approach a persua­
sive explanation of the Canadian state's approaches to immigrant women in the labour marlc.eL See, 
Immigrant Women's Editorial Collective, "Immigrant Women in Canada: 1be Politics of Sex, Race 
and Oass" (1987) l 6 Resources Foc Feminist Research 3. In otha- words, the ovcrconcentration 
on sexuality will result in taking a "short cut through women's lives" (Spehnan, supra, note 57 at 
187). 
630ne might want to consider, foc instance, Jesse Jackson's rainbow coalition comprised of those 
who are disa-npowered. For discussions see, for example, S. Collins, The Rainbuw Challt!nge: Tht! 
Jackson Campaign and the Future of U.S. Politics (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986) and 
I.M. Young who suggests that: 
[T]his is an idea of political public which goes beyond the ideal of civic friendship in 
which pa-sons unite for a common purpose on terms of equality and mutual respect. 
While it includes commitment to equality and mutual respect among participants, the 
idea of the rainbow coalition specifically presccves and institutionalizes in its form of 
organizational discussion the heterogeneous groups that make it up ("Impartiality and 
the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political The­
ory" ( 1986) 5 Pnuis Int. 381 at 398). 
See also, I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Differenu (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990). 
64Supra, note I at 83. 
65lndeed , surely one of the primary themes of Toward a Feminist Thwry of tht! Stall! is that tra­
ditional, political theory, written as it is by men, be they left or libecal, affirms the male interest, 
i.t!. the domination of women. Furthermore, this historical proposition seems curious in a book that 
otherwise seeks to be assiduously a.historical 
66 Another reality is expressed by bell hooks when she states, "Ca-ta.inly feminist struggle is not 
nearly as old as the struggle against racism in this culture" ("interview" in Talking Back, supra, 
note 59, 1 67 at 171). 
(i!Supra, note 1 at 12. 
61£.g., A.P. Harris, "Race and &.sentialism in Feminist Legal Theory" (1990) 42 Stan. L. Rev. 
581; M. Kline, "Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory" (1989) 12 Harv. WOl"Oen's L.J. 1 1 5. 
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Just as class and race tend to become second order issues, those feminist 
analyses that are distinct from MacKinnon's also fall by the wayside. MacKin­
non 's epic theory is based upon a narrowly subscribed, singular vision of fem­
inism. She writes, "[t]he challenge is to demonstrate that feminism systemati­
cally converges upon a central explanation of sex inequality through an 
approach distinctive to its subject yet applicable to the whole social life, includ­
ing class. •'69 MacKinnon is then unflinching in her specifications of what con­
stitutes feminism, for only radical femmism will do; "Radical feminism is fem­
inism. '':7° And, even more specifically, MacKinnon 's understanding of radical 
feminism is revealed to be her own, self-proclaimed.. consciousness raising 
based, unmodified, post-marxist feminism. This account, she claims, has "spe­
cial access" to the "collectiv� reality of women's condition."71 The following 
provides as concise a statement as any of MacKinnon's stance: 
A theory of sexuality becomes feminist methodologically, meaning feminist in the 
post-marxist sense, to the extenrit treats sexuality as a social construct of male 
power:  defined by men, forced on women, and constitutive of the meaning of gen­
der. Such an approach centers feminism on the perspective of the subordination of 
women to men as it identifies sex - that is, the sexuality of dominance and sub-­
mission - as crucial, as a fundamental, as on some level definitive, in that proc­
ess. Feminist theory becomes a project of analyzing that situation in order to face 
it for what it is, in order to change it.72 
Although we have found much that is enlightening in MacKinnon 's theory, 
this strictly focused, uni-dimensional analysis is dismaying given the polyvocal 
nature of feminism. One only has to look at the heterogenous nature of the 
women's movement to tmderstand the reality and necessity of its complexity.73 
69Supra, note I at 108, emphasis added. 
10 Ibid. at 1 I 7. 
11/bid. at 121 .  
72/bid. at 128. 
73Herstory shows us that to effect change in women's condition, whether formally or substan­
tively, heterogeneity is extremely useful, if not, in the final analysis, essentiaJ. For example. the 
suffrage movement in Canada required diversity in order for women to gain the vote provincially 
and federally. Middle class women doctor.; in Ontario provided the spark, but farm women in the 
west were the first to persuade ma.le politicians to grant them the vote. The movement has often 
been described as headed by white. middle class, .Anglo-Saxon women, but the nwncrous excep­
tions to this profile, from working class women dressmakers, to Icelandic women emigres, dem­
onstrate great.er complexity and suggest that these differences were in fact a crucial, if unintended, 
strategy in countering the sophisticated opposition from various sources in the home, the church 
and the state. See C. Oeverdon, TM Woman Suffrage Movemenl in Canada (foronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1974); C. Bacchi. Liberalion Defe"ed? TM Ideas of the English-Canadian Suf­
fragists, 1877-1918 (foronto: University of To.-onto Press, 1983); A. Prentice et al., Canadian 
Women: A History (foronto: Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich, 1988); and N. Adamsoo, L. Brislein & 
M. McPhail, Feminist Organizing/or Change: The Conlemporary Women's Movemenr in Canada 
(foronto: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
A more contemporary example � the rallying by a wide spccttum of Canadian women in order 
to secure equality provisions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Frttdoms, Part I of the Con-
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Feminist analyses have grown over the years and must continue to develop, to 
be open, to recognize and respond to their limitations_ Feminism's past, and 
present, shoncomings with respect to race analysis provide an important exam­
ple of its ongoing need for openness, sensitivity, malleability and corrigibility_ 
This might be called "the principle of self-reflexivity. "74 
Feminism has tended to be sceptical of "objective" and one-sided, truths 
for these have characterized male epistemology. In fact, MacKinnon spends a 
significant part of her book unpacking the inherent maleness of objectivity at its 
epistemological level thereby revealing the paniality of what counts as reality. 
She criticizes the "Western philosophical tradition" for its "methodological 
hegemony" and its "thrust . . .  to end diversity of viewpoint, so that there can be 
no valid disagreement over what knowing is right knowing. "75 However, she 
then advocates the notion of an epic theory and proceeds to espouse a new 
"master narrative"76 thereby installing an· authoritative account of women's 
reality. 
This stance leads her to denounce those people who do not subscribe to her 
theory and those practices that do not fit with her theorizing. She does this 
through use of innovative categorization. For example, liberal feminism is writ­
ten off as inter alia "individualistic" and "abistorical"77 and into this liberal fem­
inist paradigm she lumps diverse feminists, who hold wide-ranging views, such 
as Mary Daly, and Carol Gilligan,78 as well as Simone de Beauvoir and Shula­
m.ith Firestone.79 Socialist feminists, from Alexandra Kollontai to Sheila Row-
srirution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1. The women who 
became involved in this process were drawn from traditional women's organizations, radical 
women's organizations and many organizations in between. Non-partisan Canadian women, as 
well as prominent female politicians, wa-e incensed into action. Male politicians wa-e both bom­
barded by phone calls and letters from women working from .. without" and pressurized by women 
lobbying from within the political system Th.is multi-levelled strategy was, perhaps, the key to 
women's achievement of formal equality °rights. See P. Kome, The Taking ofTwenty-EighJ: Women 
Challenge the Constitution (foronto: Women's Press, 1983); C. Hosek, "Women and the Consti­
tutional Process" in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds, And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy 
and the Consrilution Act (foronto: Methuen, 1983); and S. Burt, 'The Oiarter of Rights and the 
Ad Hoc Lobby: The Limits of the Success" (1988) 14 Atlantis. 
For a broader analysis of these and other attempts by women to challenge the male political 
order, see A. Dobrowolsky, "Promises Unfulfilled: Women and the Theory and Practice of Rep­
resentative Democracy in Canada" (LLM. Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1990) [unpublished). 
74For an elaboration and discu�ion of this idea in the context of hwnan rights discoW"SC, see R 
Devlin, "Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel VJ.Sion: Reminiscences of a Renegade Rapporteur" in K. 
Mahoney & P. Mahoney, eds, Solidarity and Interdependence: A Global Challenge (Proceedings 
of the International Human Rights Conference, Banff, Nov. 1990) [forthcoming 1991]. 
15Supra, note 1 at 106-07. 
76Yearning, supra, note 2 at 25. 
11 Supra, note I at 40. 
78/bid. at 50-5 I. She considers them both to be liberal due to their "idealism." 
19 lbid. at 51-54. She sees than both as liberal in their ''naturalism." 
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both.am. fare little bener. In MacKinnon 's estimation., the former held a dis­
torted, "hybridized"80 view of feminism and marxism that ultimately subsumed 
the problem of women. For MacKinnon,. Rowbotham provides the classic exam­
ple of the "derivation and subordination strategy"81 in which the analysis of 
women's condition is granted "more separate validity than ... [before] but it nev­
ertheless reduces women's oppression to a special dimension of the class ques­
tion. "82 In the end, MacKinnon resolves that there has never been a satisfactory 
union of marxism and feminism. This conclusion is not new to the reader as 
MacKinnon explicitly states in her first chapter: 
[S]ocialist-feminism basically stands before the task of synthesis as if nothing 
e ssential to either theory fundamentally opposes their wedding ... [Therefore,] 
[h]owever sympathetically, "the woman question" is always reduced to some other 
. 83 question. 
Those feminist theorists who work on the basis of women's difference from men 
are also thoroughly critiqued. MacKinnon claims that their efforts, 
limit feminism to correcting sex bias by acting in theory as if male power did not 
exist in fact, including by valorizing in writing what women have had little choice 
but to be limited to becoming in life, is to limit feminist theory the way sexism 
limit s women's lives: to a response to terms men set 84 
We shall return to the question of difference later. In the final analysis, it seems 
that almost every other feminist, with perhaps the exception of Andrea Dwor­
kin, has been polluted by malestream assumptions, and only "[f)eminism unmo­
dified, methodologically postmarxist feminism., aspires to better,'.as greener 
pastures. 
Our suggestion is not that MacKinnon is mistaken in her intel])retation, but 
that it is only an intel])retation and not the intel])retation. It should not, there­
fore, have any claims to "special access"86 in terms of comprehending women 's social reality, for what in fact happens is the opposite . MacKinnon 's theoretical 
rigidity ironically leads to a situation where she disregards the practical and 
contextual realities of women in favour of the theoretical principle. This occurs 
even though MacIGnnon makes it clear that she respects women's knowledge 
based on their lived experiences, with, for instance, her faith in consciousness 
raising as political praxis. Her proclivity toward philosophical intractability is 
apparent in her characterization of the rape issue. In her analysis, rape should 
not be seen as violence as distinct from sex, for it is "an act of subordination 
80/bid. at 63. 
81/bid. at 62. 
82/bid. 
'3/bid. at 12. 
"'Ibid. at 128. 
15/bid. at 241. 
16/bid. at 121. 
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of women to men ... [and it] expresses and reinforces women's inequality."87 
This may be theoretically appropriate, but who is to say that given a specific 
rape incident, we should not accept the fact that a woman might feel the vio­
lence and not the sex? 
An even better illustration of this tendency is evident in MacK.innon 's anal­
ysis of abortion. MacK.innon is wisely critical of using privacy as a legal loop­
hole to gain access to abortion. She suggests that the law of privacy "translates 
traditional liberal values into the rhetoric of individual rights as a means of sul:r 
ordinating those rights to specific social imperatives. "88 She goes on to explain 
that the problem of using the idea of privacy is that it legitimizes the liberal ide­
ology of the public/private dichotomy which, amongst other things, assumes the 
private realm is free, when in fact it has never been so for women. For women. 
the private realm has been the sphere of exclusion and domination. the site of 
violence and abuse. 89 1berefore, · MacKinnon believes that the right to privacy 
isolates .. women at once from each other and from public recourse. This right 
to privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time. 
It embodies and reflects the private sphere's existing definition of woman­
hood.''90 Lastly, MacKinnon directs us to Andrea Dworkin's link between abor­
tion and male desire, which identifies the bottom line: "[g]etting laid (is) at 
stake"91 that is to say, abortion makes intercourse more accessible for men. 
Although we theoretically agree with most of MacKi.Im.on 's concerns here, 
practically, a woman faced with an unwanted pregnancy would use any loop­
hole available to assist her in her immediate circumstances. Perhaps in spite of 
herself, MacKinnon censures due to her absolute, theoretical considerations, but 
she does not consider the various contingencies, the grassroots repercussions. 
The principle is important, but so are the lack of alternatives for women and the 
importance of some abortion rights, however flawed, in view of the dire conse­
quences of no abort.ion rights: unwanted children. death due to illegal abortions 
et cetera. This, of course, is not to say that we should not strive for certain goals. 
Clearly we must work towards achieving the most liberating circumstances for 
women in law and in life. Rather, the point is that MacKinnon leaves insuffi­
cient room for women to maneuver in their strategies of survival in this male 
dominated and controlled social order. As a result, the theory seems to be too 
17 Ibid. at 1 82. 
r,, Ibid. at 187. 
�r a discussion of how the significance of the private realm may differ on the basis of race 
or class see b. hooks, .. Homeplace: A Site of Resistance" in Ylllrning, supra, note 2, 41.  
90Supra, note 1 at 194. 
91/bid. at 1 90. 
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disconnected from the "politics of location:'92 that is, the multiplicities and complexities of womens lives. 
B. Problems of Over-Inclusion 
The foregoing comments highlight the problem of under-inclusiveness in 
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. MacKinnon's discussion of the concept 
of power is an example of over-inclusion. Central to MacKinnon 's thesis is her 
theory of the power of men over women. However, in spite of the foundational 
status of this argument, and indeed her own claim that one of "the most basic 
questions of politics" is "the nature of power and its distribution,''93 MacKinnon 
appears to fudge her analysis · of the extent and nature of that power. For exam­ple, throughout her discussions, power is portrayed through a multitude of adjectives, descriptions and metaphors.94 In om opinion, these cannot be under­
stood as simply a series of attempts to describe the same subject, male power 
over women. They encapsulate different and not necessarily compatible concep­
tions of the distribution and very nature of power. If arranged on what we might 
call a "continuum of oppression" these descriptions of power could range from 
"control or systemic or hegemonic power" at the lower end, to '"omnipotent or 
total power" at the higher encl At no point does MacKinnon directly address the 
theoretical issue of the extent of male power, a lacmla that is surprising in what 
describes itself as an epic theory of that power. 
· This is not just a question of semantics, because depending on which one 
of these conceptions more accurately reflects her miderstanding of the nature 
and distribution of male power, it will of necessity impact on the viability, 
indeed even the possibility of feminism. If male power more closely approxi­mates the "total or supreme power" end of the spectrum, then it will be theoret­
ically and practically impossible for feminism to claim "the voice of women's 
silence "95 and "feminism mimodified''96 - Mac Kinnon' s feminism - must also 
be a lie because it too nrust have been "shoved down (women's) throats.'m If, 
92b. hooks. 'Third World Diva Girls: politics of feminist solidarity", supra, note 57 at 89; b. 
hooks. "Clloosing the Margin as a Space of Radical Openness" in Yearning, supra, note 2, 145 at 
145. 
93MacKinnon, supra, note 1 at 41. 
94Consider, e.g., the various ways that MacKinnon. ibid. portrays power in her book: 
"dominance" at ix; "social hegemony" at x; "control" at 4; "male supremacy" at 33; "sexism's 
omnipresence" at 90; "a major part of gender definition" at 92; "encompassing" at 103; "systemic 
and hegemonic" at 114; "male totality" at 115; ''pervasive and tenacious" at 116; "metaphysically 
nearly perfect" at 116; "closed system" at 121; "omnipotent" at 125; "nearly everywhere" at 130; 
"largely wuvcrsal if always in specific fonns" at 151; "it is the regime" at 170 [emphasis in orig­
inal); "a total system" at 239; and "intractable" at 242. 
95 Ibid. at 117. 
96lbid. 
97lbid. 
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however, male power more closely approximates the "pervasive and hegemonic power" end of the spectrum. then it is possible to understand why and how 
women resist and thereby provide a theoretical comprehension of the agency of 
women. It recognizes the possibility of crevices and contradictions within the 
patriarchal order (including, for example, Mac.Kinnon 's own favoured emanci­
patory strategy, equality doctrine in the Supreme Court of the United States, but 
also, as we will suggest, otber potential sources such as the discourse of differ­
ence and the ethic of care) and encourages the search for centres of resistance, 
and the valorization of modes of feminist power_ Hence. much the same critique 
that MacKinnon levels against neo-marxists who espouse the relative autonomy 
thesis98 to the relationship between economics and the state, can be applied to 
Mac Kinnon 's thesis on power: "[W}hat qualifies what is as ambiguous as it is 
crucial" and thus it is unclear· "where to go to do something about it. •'99 
MacKinnon 's conceptualization of power requires greater clarity and spec­
ificity as to the distribution of power within contemporary patriarchal society 
and perhaps a more acute historical sensitivity to the changing distributions of male power. For example, what makes equality discourse, in the juncture with 
late twentieth century American liberalism. potentially responsive to the equal­
ity as anti-domination thesis? Would such an argument even be comprehensible 
in, for instance, mid-twentieth century Quebec, when women were denied 
98The relative autonomy thesis is an explanatory structure developed by neo-marrists to explain 
that although the state or law cannot be understood as a simple imtrumental reflex of economic 
relations, that there is a certain independence of legal and political relations from economic rela­
tions_ In other words, Marxist analysis is still essentially correct in that the independence is not 
absolute for ultimately legal and political relations do correlate with the structural requirements of 
capitalism. For one lucid discussion of the thesis see, J. Fudge, "Marx's Theory of History and a 
Marxist Analysis of Law" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal The.ory (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery. 1990) 151 at 155-56. 
99Supra, note I at 159. This problem of a lack of precision in defining the na ture, extent and 
distribution of maJe power, and consequently the viability of a feminist critique, is replica ted in 
relation to her theory of sexu ality. 1be central dynamic of MacKinnon's analysis is that women's 
sexuality is simply the construc t of male power - "what is called sexuality is the dynamic of con­
trol by which male dominance ... ernticiz.es and thus defines man and woman, gender identity and 
sexual pleasure" (supra, at 137). However, a deconstructive reading reveals a more nuanced 
account_ For example, after twenty-five p ages of what seems to be an absolutist conception of  the 
male construction of sexuality, this appears to be modified when she says that "so-called women's 
sexuality largely a construct of male sexuality searching for someplace to happen" (supra, at 152, 
emphasis added). Is i t  or is it not? If sexuality is not a total male conmuct. why not? Which part 
is not? How not? And these questions are intensified on the following page through a fairly cryptic, 
and perhaps problematic, reference to the parallel between women's sexuality and Black culture 
when she argues that it both is and is not theirs. At this point. she acknowledges that as a response 
to powerlessness, oppression and exclusion i t  might still be possible to conceive of Black culture 
and women's sexuality as "a source of strength, joy, expression, and as an affirmative badge of 
pride ... They may be part of a strategy for survivaJ or even of change" (supra, at 153). This ambi­
guity has deleterious ramifications: first, i t  suggests theoretical laxity; and second. it  provides little 
guidance as to how feminists (or Black men, or Black feminists) should proceed. 
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formal equality in terms of the provincial franchise and "had no value in their 
own right .. . only as mothers" as "their status was directly proportional to the 
number of children they produced?"100 What do these different historical con­
junctures tell us about the comprehensiveness, or lack thereof. and mutational 
nature of male power?101 
Apart from these historical and quantitative issues of the distribution of 
power, we also have concerns about MacKinnon 's qualitative conception of the 
nature of power. The common thread running through MacKinnon 's long list of 
adjectives describing the modes of power is that they all reflect an understand­
ing of power as cognate of .. power over" which, we think, is a unilateral con­
ception of power. 102 It echoes a Weberian, negative and repressive analysis of 
power, a lawyerly vision of power, 103 what Foucault describes as a juridical con­
ception of power. 104 But power is more than simply pervasive and systemic. It 
is also heterogenous, polymorphous and multifaceted.1os Power can be under­
stood in the sense of "power to' .. as well as "power over." "Power to" is power as a cognate of freedom, a progressive, emancipatory and potentially transform­
ative conception of power, a conception which emphasizes the creative, 
1000. Lamoureux. "Nationalism and Feminism in Quebec: An hnpossible Attraction" in H.J. 
Maroney & M. Luxton, eds, F�minism and Political &onomy: Women's Work, Women's Struggles 
(f oronto: Methuen, 1987) at 58. 
101A further omission is that although MacK.innon spends a great deal of time describing the 
ways in which men dominate and women are subordinated, including rape, battery, sexual harass­
ment, sexual abuse of children, prostitution and pornography, curiously, very little is said about 
why men behave in this way, except to claim that it fits with the "interest from the male point of 
view" (supra, note 1 at 112). To be sure, the whole book can be read as illustrative of why the sub­
ordination of women is in men's interests. But, on occasion, MacKinnon indicates that not all men 
dominate, and that some might even choose not to do so (supra, at 94). If it is in his interest to 
dominate, why would any man ever make such a choice? Does this suggest that interest is not the 
same as political perspective and preference, and therefore, that this element of her argument needs 
greater development? Moreover, at one point. she even mentions that Robert Dahl is one of the 
world's "ten nicest men" (supra, at xvi). Yet, on the basis of her theory of power, it is difficult to 
see that as a man he could be nice. 1be personal is the political, is it not? Does the inverse not 
also hold true, particularly given Dahl's liberalism, and liberalism's complicity in women's 
domination? 
1D2For similar concerns about the prevalence of .. generic" statements about power/powerlessness 
advocated by both sociologists and feminists see A Duffy. "Reformulating Power for Women" 
(1986) 23 Can. Rev. Soc. & _Anth. 22. 
103see R. Devlin, "Nomos and Thanat06 (Part A). The Killing Fields: Modem Law and Legal 
Theory" (1989) 12 Dalhousie L.J. 298. 
1� Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected /nJerviews and Other Writings, trans. C. Gordon, 
ed. (New York: Pantheon., 1980). 
1� following reflections on power are influenced, in part, by the work of Foucault although 
they aspire to a somewhat different, that is optimistic, agenda than his. See Foucault, ibid.; M. Fou­
cault. Discipline and Punish (New Yolk: Pantheon., 1984); M. Foucault, The History of Sexualiry 
(New Yolk: Vmtage, 1988); J. Sawicki, "Foucault and Faninism: Toward a Politics of Difference" 
(1986) 2 Hypatia 23; I. Diamond & L Quinby, eds, Feminism and Foucault: Refiectwns on Strat­
eg� of Resistance (Boston: Northwestern University Press, 1 988). 
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capacity-enhancing, ability-encouraging, variation of power. 106 This is a qualita­tively different conception of power. Men may understand and use power in its imperialistic guise in order to dominate women 107 but that does riot mean that 
"power over" is the immutable essence of power. Feminism. we want to sug­gest, may pose the opportunity to conceptualize and nourish another, emancipa­tory side of power, a side that expands our horiwns rather than curtails them. 
a side that nurtures our personhood rather than stultifies it, a side that fosters 
care for inherent human dignity. bell hooks, for example, addresses the possibil­
ities of the power of love: 
In reconceptualizing and reformulating strategies for future feminist movement, 
we need to concentrate on the politicization of love, not just in the context of talk­
ing about victimization ... but in a critical discussion where love can be understood 
as a powerful force that challenges and resists domination. 108 
Fem.ini.sm. rather than working within and thereby reproducing the androcentric 
interpretation/imposition of power, may be able to challenge the very meaning 
of power itself. 
To be fair to MacK.innon, interstitially, there are suggestions that her anal­
ysis and reconstructive vision incorporate a transformed109 and non-repressive 
conception of power, but these are disturbingly underdeveloped. For example, 
when she argues that "radical feminism is developing a theory of male power, in which powerlessness is a problem but redistribution of power as cu"entfy 
defined is not its ultimate solution, upon which to build a feminist theory of jus­tice "110 there is a suggestion that there is a radical feminist reconception of 
power, though we are given no indication as to what it might look like.m Fur­
thermore, the reference to "ultimate" suggests that in the meantime the current, 
that is male, conception is available for feminist use. Thus, within the transi­
tional period from patriarchal domination to the dese:xualized egalitarian society 
1�ee Y. Cohen, 'Thoughts on Women and Power" in A. Miles & G. Finn, eds, Feminism: From 
Pressure to Polirics (Montreal: Bia.ck Rose Books, 1982) at 263; and G. Rnn, "Conclusion," supra 
at 302. 
1arwe would also point out that women are not the only victims of power in this form. Some 
men have power over other men on the basis of, for ex.ample, class, race or sexual preference. 
Another example is that, perhaps, humankind in general responds to the environment on the basis 
of this paradigm. 
108"feminism: a transformational politic" in Talking Back, supra, note 59, 19 at 26. hooks draws 
on the work of Paulo Fricre who embraces the power of love as he writes: "I am more and more 
convinced that true revolutionaries must perceive the revolution, because of its creative and liber­
ating nan.ire, as an act of love" (Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. M.B. Ramos (New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1970)). 
10'9Supra, note l at 125. 
110/bid. at 46, emphasis added. 
111 Another ex.ample is to be found in her discussion of the ability of "male power to create the 
world in its own image ... power to shape reality� (Ibid. at 1 18). See also some passing comments 
(supra at 230). 
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a key element of the patriarchal order, power in its repressive mode, is to remain 
available. Are we to assume that it will eventually wither away? Or, will it be 
necessary to work towards its transcendence? And what about Audre Lorde's 
warning that the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house?112 
Further ambivalences in Towards a Feminist Theory of the State indicate 
that we cannot even be sure that if we were to reach MacKinnon 's vaguely envi­
sioned society that there would be a feminist form of power. distinct from power 
in its male mode, because, as mentioned earlier, her discussion tends to manifest 
the essentialist. Weberian, and juridical conception of power. Consider, for 
instance, her proposition that male power combines, .. like any form of power, 
legitimation with force .''113 The taken for granted assumptions are that male 
power is but a specific form of power, with which we would agree. and the fur­
ther assumption, with which we would disagree, is that power, generically, is 
necessarily repressive. 1bis resonates with the naturalism of which MacKinnon 
accuses others. Our conceptualization does not capitulate to the liberal idealism 
of "as if," nor does it indulge in the "analytic wish-fulfillment"114 that feminism 
can simply reimagine power and that then everything will be fine. Rather, it is 
to refuse to surrender to the patriarchal, false necessity115 that maleness is all. 
We therefore criticize MacK.innon on the same basis that she criticizes sexual 
liberation feminists. in that she "uncritically adopts as an analytic tool the cen­
tral dynamic of the phenomenon . .. [she] purports to be analyzing. "1 16 As a 
result, MacKinnon may have failed to challenge male supremacism at its core. 
By espousing an overly inclusive conception of power and by omitting any seri­
ous discussion of a feminist reconstruction of power, the assumption of hierar­
chy and therefore of domination, remains entrenched. 
What then might a feminist reconstruction and reconceptualization look 
like? What has MacKinnon omitted that we would include so as to offer a more 
sustained and destabilizing challenge to malestream domination? Pursuant to 
our earlier proposition that feminism must remain faithful to its polyvocal 
nature, we would argue that equalitarianism though vital, cannot be the sole 
shining path for feminism, and that, for example, the discourse of "difference" 
and "the ethic of care" could also be considered as legitimate and potentially 
fruitful modes of analysis and praxis . 
112A. Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Trumansburg, N.Y.: Crossing Press , 1984) 
1 10  at 112. 
113Supra, note 1 at 122. 
114/bid. at 135. 
nssce R.M Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical 
Democracy (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
116Supra, note 1 at 135-36. 
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In this book, as in Feminism Unmodified and the Buffalo debate, 117 
MacKinnon devotes especial space to a critique of those (women in particular) 
who find value in the concept and discourse of "difference" and maintains that 
the radical feminist approach must focus its attention on equality as anti­
domination. Difference, she argues, is a derivative concept, attributed signifi­
cance by the pre-existing, hierarchy-imposing male order, and therefore irre­
trievably antithetical to women's interest: "the velvet glove on the iron fist of 
domination."118 Once again, although this time only briefly, she singles out the 
work of Carol Gilligan,119 denouncing it for its "liberal idealism." its failure '<to 
situate thought in social reality," and for analyzing "women's situation as if 
equality, in spite of everything, already ineluctably existed."120 This critique, we 
suggest, is somewhat harsh and inaccurate. 
First, there is MacKinnon 's claim that Gilligan misses women's social real­
ity, and its implicit assumption that MacKinnon has got it. No doubt both 
women have insights on women's experiences of the world. but by what criteria 
does Mac.Kinnon dismiss Gilligan's analysis? As far as we can see, none except 
that it does not fit with MacK.innon 's own epic theory. There is no argument that 
Gilligan's research strategy is flawed, and indeed. when we compare the 
approaches of MacKinnon and Gilligan as they each attempt to portray women's 
realities, Gilligan's seems more direct and less mediated, or filtered. than 
MacKinnon 's. Whereas Gilligan's scholarship reports and interprets the results 
of research specifically designed to tune into women's perceptions, MacK.in­
non 's scholarship, in the tradition of mainstream political theory, tends to be less 
contextual and more assertive as to what people, and in her case, women in par­
ticular, want. 1bis is not to posit that MacKinnon is misinterpreting women. 
after all she has organized hearings around pornography in Minnesota, but sim­
ply to query her self-perceived "special access" to women's social reality. Put 
simply, it is surprising· to us to think that any feminist would want to argue that 
there is just one social reality for women.121 
Second, MacKinnon argues that Gilligan makes it "seem as though 
women's moral reasoning is somehow women 's"122 but this, we think. is a mis-
1171. Man:us & P. Spiegelman, "Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conver­
sation" (1985) 34 Buffalo L Rev. 1 1  [hereinafter Discourse]. 
11 8Supra, note 1 at 219. 
119See C. Gilligan.In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Developmenl (Cam-_ bridge: Harvard University Press, 1 982) [hereinafter Voice]. 
120supra. note 1 at 51 .  
121Charlotte Bunch discusses feminism in tams of a transformational politics, for it strives to 
change structures as well as people, and in so doing it must take into consideration that '1A] crucial 
point of the process is understanding that reality does not look the same from different people's 
p=pective" (Passwnare Politics: Feminist Theory in Action: Essays 1968-1986 (New York.: St. 
Martin's Press, 1987) at ). 
122Supra, note 1 at 5 1 .  
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reading of Gilligan's research, though perhaps not of some of those who have 
applied her analysis. m Although, on occasion. Gilligan does identify difference 
with "feminine,"124 she is at pains to point out that she is not talking about a 
women's morality_ At the very beginning of In a Different Voice, Gilligan 
unequivocally states: 
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its asso­
c iation with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through 
women's voices that I trace its development. But this association is not absolute, 
and the c ontrasts between male and female voices  presented here to highlight a 
distinction between two modes of thought and to  focus a problem of intetpretation 
rather than t o  represent a generalization about either sex. 
125 
Moreover, in a debate with MacKinnon, Gilligan declared, "I deliberately called 
it a different voice, I did not call it a woman's voice."126 How can MacKinnon 
not listen to this other woman? Or, is it that she just does not believe Gilligan? 
Third. MacK.innon 's rejection of the discourse of difference and care on the 
basis that they reaffirm powerlessness and are part of the package which has 
been forced upon women by men leads her to charge advocates of such perspec­
tives with being liberal idealists "who do not take social determination and the 
realities of power seriously enough."127 While we think that this critique of dif­
ference is an important warning against the dangers of utopianism, 123 it tends to 
be overstated. An advocacy of difference need not be based on an essentialist, 
reductionist vision of male/female nature, absolute, incorrigible, transcendental, 
reified_ Rather, we understand difference to be part of the broader matrix of 
social relations as culturally129 (within which we would include politics) and 
psychologically constructed. It is a deeply entrenched ideology, but an ideology 
nonetheless. 130 Toe consciousness that the discourse of difference is an ideology 
123See e.g .• K. Karst. "Women's Constitution" (1984) Duke LJ. 447. 
124Voice, supra, note 121  at 105.  
125/bid. at 2. 
126Discourse, supra, note 1 19 at 38. 
121Supra, note 1 at 51-52. 
U8See, e.g., S_ Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking" and S. Ruddick, "Preservative and Military 
Destruction: Some Reflections on Mothering and Peace" in J. Trebilcol, eel., Mothering: Essays in 
Feminist Tluory (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983). 
129sec C. GouJd, "The Woman Question: The Philosophy of Literature and the Literature of Phi­
losophy" in C. Gould & M- Wartofsky, eds, Women and Philosophy (New York: Putnam, 1972); 
L Finley, "Oioice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice" (1987) 96 Yale 
LJ. 914 at 932--33; and R. W. Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics 
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
UOSce N. Oiodorow, ''Gender Relation and Difference in Psychoanalytic Perspective" in H. 
Eisenstein & A. Judine, eds, The Future of Diffuence (Boston: GK- Hall. 1980); A. Jardine, "Pre­
lude", supra, at xxv; M. Wittig, "Paradigm" in G. Starnbolian & E. Mads, eels, Homosexualities 
and French literature (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1 979) 1 15; M. Minow, "Justice 
Engendered" (1987) 101 Harv. L- Rev. 10 at 3 1 .  
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- even a pervasive ideology - is therapeutic in that it indicates not only the 
artifactual nature of the discourse, but also its contingency and mutability, as 
well as its vulnerability to assessment and valorization. In the spirit of MacKin­
non 's critical enterprise, we can ask: valued by whom and for what reasons? 
Where we differ from her is that, echoing her theories of power and sexuality, 
she sees the discourse of difference as masculinist ventriloquism, and therefore 
seems to reject it in toto. Due to our more expansive conception of power, one 
that recognizes the possibility of strategies of resistance, while recognizing the 
historical and political nexus between the discourse of difference and male dom­
ination. we refuse to succumb to the essentialist equation that difference is equi­
valent to domination and subordination. In short, we see the discourse of differ­
ence, like the discourse of �ty, as a terrain of feminist struggle, "essentially 
contestable"131 and potentially salvageable. 132 
Fourth. as a matter of feminist praxis, in our experience, the discourse of 
difference has been a mobilizing influence for many women and to reject it 
absolutely is to risk abandoning a discursive practice that has been crucial to 
maintaining the ranks of the women's movement. This is particularly worrisome 
given the current politico-historical conjuncture when it is claimed by males­
tream society that we are now in. a post-feminist era. Feminism simply cannot 
afford the luxury of an exclu.sivist perfectionism. 
It is not difference in and of itself that drives us to resist MacKinnon's 
polemic, though we do believe that law and politics need to develop a greater 
responsiveness to this component of our community. 133 More expansively, it is 
our analysis of what the substantive difference of the different voice might be. 
Rephrased. what is at stake in the debate over difference is not solely whether 
society should tolerate and encourage diversity, but also, what sort of political 
morality should guide our agenda? Rather than relating the debate to one of gen­
der difference, we believe that it can be better understood as a debate around 
two political moralities: an ethic of "indifference"134 and an "ethic of care."135 
The former, we suggest, has been the dominant political morality and is thus, 
to some degree, responsible for the masculinist disregard for women's integrity. 
Toe latter provides the foundational elements of, and the possibility for the 
expansion of, a political counter-morality that could be used to support substan-
131W.B. Gallic, "F.ssentially Contested Concepts" (1956) LVI Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society N.S. 167. 
132FO£ a significantly more nuanced appr-oach to difference see M. Minow, Making All the Dif­
ference (lthica. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
133See N. Duclos, "Lessons of Difference: Feminist 1beory and Cultural Diversity" (1990) 38 
Buffalo L Rev. 325. 
134Voice, supra, note 121 at 22. 
135See also J. Tronto. "Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care" (1987) 12 Signs 644; 
E.F. Kittay & D.T. Meyers, eds, Women and Moral Theory (fotowa: N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1987). 
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tive equality for women. Insofar as the juridical conception of power tends to 
devalue the integrity of the victim of power, it correlates with the ethic of indif­
ference. Insofar as the expansive conception of power can contemplate the 
empowerment of the other, it dovetails with the ethic of care. Viewed in this 
light, perhaps it is MacKinnon who does not take the realities of power seriously enough in that her own analysis is too uni-dimensional, it too quickly abandons 
a potential source for the pursuit of women's substantive equality, when more 
than one route may in fact be necessary. Conceiving of "power to" as a cognate of care is not necessarily indulging in liberal idealism. To the contrary, it might 
simply provide us with some guidance as to how we might proceed. 136 
Additionally, we want t� suggest that, despite MacKinnon's bold state­
ments eschewing the discourse of care as a patriarchal dead end, we detect, once 
again, a vague ambivalence regarding the relationship between radical feminism 
and the ethic of care. In keep4lg with her social constructionist thesis that 
woman is an artifact, she seems to reject a feminist affinity for care on the basis 
that "Pemaps women value care because men have valued women according to 
the care they give."137 At first blush, and in the context of the surrounding par­
agraphs which are a critique of the liberal idealism of the discourse of differ­
ence, this may appear to be a repudiation of care as a viable feminist strategy. 
However, it is worth noting that this is one of the few occasions in MacKinnon 's 
scholarship that she is tentative in her critique, prefacing her comments with a 
"pemaps." The suspicion that MacK.innon might still believe that care has some role to play in the radical feminist agenda is further reinforced through her cri­
tique of contemporary industrial society's version of. the feminine stereotype, and the sexual significance of each element of the stereotype: 0docile, soft, pas­
sive, nurturant, vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, childlike, incompetent, masochis­
tic, and domestic, made for childcare, home care, and husband care."138 In clas­
sic MacKinnon style, over· the subsequent paragraphs. she proceeds to 
illuminate the nexus between each of these elements and male sexual desire. 
What is uncharacteristic is that missing from this deconstruction are the final 
three elements, all of which revolve around care. We are not suggesting that 
136To be clear, we want to argue that any comection between women and care is contingent and 
not sex reductionist. Reference to a different voice helps us to gain a critical di.stance on the hegem­
ony and partiality of malestrcam analysis, it is not reification of the feminine essence. It provides 
us with an opportunity to comider what the substantive difference of a different voice might be 
and how that can be used both to destabilize the dominance of the male world view, while at the 
same time cautiously adumbrating some, admittedly corrigible. guidelines as to how we might pr� 
cccd. The ethic of care is at once a political, legal and moral benchmark. that directly challenges 
the moral relativism of the liberal state. 
For further discussion on difference and the ethic of care, see R Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos 
(Part B), Fcrninisrn as Jurisgcnerativc Transformation. or Resistance Through Partial Incorpora­
tion?" (1990) 13 Dalhousie LJ. 123. 
131Supra, note 1 at 51 .  
131/bid. at 109. 
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there is no connection between care and the sexual construction of the female 
character. We do wonder, however, why MacK.innon is so unusually incomplete 
in her analysis. Could it be that she does not consider care as totally imposed 
on women by men and therefore that it may not be completely irretrievable? 
It is difficult to express what we are trying to get at here, and this, we think, 
relates to the way MacK.innon develops her own arguments. In her crusade to 
develop an epic theory, MacK.innon wants to be as clear and explanatorily com­
prehensive as possible. To do this she is driven at times to eliminate discussion 
of complicating factors. Nevertheless, these interacting elements are like "sub­
jugated knowledges,"139 continually threatening to irrupt, to break through the 
coherence of the totalizing argument. MacKinnon 's theory seems caught in this 
vortex. Our suspicion is that she does have a more comprehensive vision, but 
driven by the logic of her own theory, she is forced to bury these issues. Still, 
in spite of herself, they, time and again, tend to resurface. The interment cannot 
be complete. This, perhaps, explains how MacKinnon can, in the main, ostra­
cize the ideology of difference, and then, at the odd moment, hint at its 
potential. 
Still, there is no denying that in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 
MacKinnon, for the most part, shows little restraint in her denunciation of dif­
ference and the ethic of care. Given the intensity of MacK.innon 's disapproba­
tion of difference, we believe that her theory of power must also be applied to 
her own preferred agenda, equalitarianism, that is, her ambition to translate and 
transmute issues such as rape, pornography, prostitution, incest, battery, abor­
tion, and gay and lesbian rights into sex equality issues under law. If it is true 
that the discourse of difference and the ethic of care are simply male ventrilo­
quism and that male power is omnipresent, how is the discourse of equality, any 
more than the discourse of difference, not "a response to terms men set?"140 
What is it about equality, and particularly equality as MacK.innon conceives of 
it, that renders it uncontaminated by maleness? Indeed, even the most cursory 
reflection on the history of the concept of equality suggests it has been a central 
preoccupation for the malestream western philosophical tradition, from Aristo­
tle through Locke, Kant, Marx, Mill, Rawls and now Ronald Dworkin.1'1 Since 
difference has been a more marginal concern to our philosophical forefathers, 
it may be, in fact, less overdetermined by patriarchal assumptions than 
equalitarianism. 
139For a discussion of the ''insurrcctional" potential of "subjugated knowledges" sec M. Fou­
cault, Power!Krwwledge, supra, note 106 at 81. 
140Supra, note 1 at 128. 
141For a useful discussion of the "phallocentricity" of traditional equality discourse see C. Lit­
tleton, "Reconstructing Sexual Equality" (1987) 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1279. 
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More broadly, why does MacK.innon seem to insist that only equalitarian­
ism is appropriate, thereby embracing the dualistic thought of either/or? Would 
it not be possible to adopt an "integrative approach"142 that could draw on the 
best elements of both traditions? Thus, her critique of the use of difference by 
Rosalind Rosenberg, an expert who testified in the Sears v. EEOC case,143 is too 
facile as it is obvious that the result of arguing a difference analysis in this par­
ticular context would be continued economic inequality. However, there may be 
situations in which one would want to draw on the discourse of difference to 
argue differential treatment in order to achieve equality of results,144 even if it 
is only to counteract past discrimination and enforced inequality. This need not 
be protectionism. Consider, for example, former Chief Justice Dickson's sug­
gestion in the context of religion that: 
The e quality necessary to support religious freedom does not require identical 
treatment of all religions. In fact , the interest of true freedom may require differ­
entiation in treatment . 14s 
Within a patriarchal social order, neither difference nor equality can be uncriti­
cally adopted by feminists but, by the same token, neither is necessarily and 
completely taboo. Much will depend upon the context in which the particular 
problem arises, both on micro and macro-political levels, an important flexibil­
ity that pe:rhaps an epic theory cannot accommodate . 
Further, if we are to be in the business of doctrinal revisioning - as 
MacKinnon appears to be in her last chapter with its analysis of equalitarianism 
as an interstitial tradition in the American Supreme Court - we would like to 
propose that such case law could just as easily be interpreted through the prism 
of the ethic of care. Consider, for example, her reinterpretation of Brown v. 
Board of Education: "Brown saw [the feelings of inferiority generated by apart­
heid] from the standpoint of the Black challenge to white supremacy, envi­
sioning a social equality that did not yet exist. "146 Could one not also hypoth­
esize that the Court, by holding racial segregation unconstitutional, was 
translating the ethic of care into constitutional form and providing a remedy for 
142See A. Miles, "Integrative Feminism" in Feminism in Canada. supra, note 108 at 12; "The 
Integrative Feminine Principle In North American Feminist Radicalism: Value Basis of a New 
Feminism" (1981) 4 Women's Studies lnt'l. Q. 481. 
143Supra, note 1 at 223. 
144For a further discussion of this type of proposal see C. Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology and 
�ion" (1986) 10  Dalliousie LJ. 195 at 21 6-18. 
145R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] l S.C.R 295 at 347. 18 D.L.R (4th) 321. 
146Supra, note 1 at- 240. We think that it is rather cmious that although MacKinnon makes ref­
erence to other cases that are more directly related to gender that she should take as her star exam­
ple of deviationist legal doctrine a case that is primarily about race. Of course, Black women would 
be affected by such a decision, but given the focus of her epic theory, women's status, the choice 
of case seerm inconsistent and raises a host of questions as to the transferability of analysis 
between gender and race (and class). 
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the harm caused by apartheid?147 Moreover, this approach might avoid a danger 
inherent in MacKinnon 's analysis which implicitly suggests that the Court could 
by some process of .. negative capability"148 get inside .. the standpoint· of the 
Black challenge" a suggestion that we fear is quite dangerous. We doubt that 
there is any way that an all white, privileged male court could ever really come 
to terms with the Black standpoint. The pretence that they might be able to do 
so runs the risk of a white appropriation and encoding of that Black existential 
reality. This is not to say that the privileged have no role to play in relation to 
those who have been subordinated. It is simply to attempt to carefully define the 
nature of the relationship and to minimize the danger of beneficent, neer 
imperialism. The ethic of care, in so far as it acknowledges that there are two 
discrete subjects, the one who cares and the one who is cared for, in so far as 
it acknowledges that one has greater resources than the other. does not suggest 
that the carer be in the position of the cared for. Rather, it demands that the per­
son in the stronger position attempt. so far as it is possible. to mderstaod the 
needs of the weaker party and to use her or his power to remedy the situation. 
This recognizes the intersubjectivity of the parties. and encourages a solidarity, 
but resists the pretence that the carer really knows what it is like to be the cared 
for. 
By extension, we would suggest that each of the other issues such as rape, 
abortion. pornography and sex discrimination. that Mac.Kinnon argues must be 
reconceptualized as sex equality issues could also be filtered through a juridical 
prism of the ethic of care: that the law care for the experience and the perspec­
tive of women who are raped, victimized by pornography, discriminated against 
or require an abortion, and provide remedies accordingly. Our point here is 
modest. The ethic of care is not necessarily incompatible with MacKinnon's 
equalitarianism. indeed it may even be reinforcing. and thus for MacKinnon to 
close off this avenue is to forgo one of the few reconstructive opportunities that 
women might have for the sake of a juridical strategy that. even in its best light, 
has only a tenuous (though hopefully expandable) influence in contemporary 
North American legal discourse. 
As a final point, assuming that MacKinnon's preference is for the more 
totalistic conception of male power. it is puzzling how her sex equality approach 
u7To be clear, we are not suggesting that the court actually did draw on such an ethos, in the 
same way as we doubt that it was "really" adopting the stance attnbuted to it by MacKinnon. The 
revision of preced�t is always a strategy of "as if," the ex post facto construction of a doctrinal 
paradigm. motivated by the purpose of having your particular inteiprctation canonized (if only 
temporarily) by judicial sanctification. 
141See John Keats, "Lener to George and Tom Keats, 21 December, 1817" in H.E. Rollins, ed., 
TM Letters of John Keats 1814-1821 Vol. I (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1958) 191 at 193. For a discussion of the "sympathetic possibilities of the imagination" see 
W.J. Bate, "Negative Capability" in John Keats (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) at 
233. 
TEXT - 0:\MCGJLL\96541006.l,l...T FOOTNOTE - O:\MCGILL\96548006.ULT PAGEPROOF I ' 
602 REVUE DE DROIT DE McGIU [Vol. 36 
can escape the male referent that she accuses difference discourse of emulating. 
According to her thesis, maleness has constructed the world. Would it not then 
follow that everything women could aspire to must, either formally or substan­
tively, bear the mark of maledom? A more nuanced analysis of power, co� 
bined with an openness to the differential dynamic of care, provides, somewhat 
more optimistically, for the possibility of achieving a feminist future. 
m. Reconceptualizing Consciousness Raising: Caution and Creativity 
To this point, our focus has been on the simultaneously under- and over­
inclusive aspects of Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, and particularly 
MacK.innon 's reluctance to expand her argument so as to be hospitable to other 
feminist and critical analyses. The power as domination thesis, and its inverse, 
the equality as anti-domination thesis, appear to be the guiding axes for her 
argument and the result, we have suggested, is too absolute, too impoverished 
in its conception of women's agency and ultimately too sparse in its proposals 
as to where feminism should go from here. To further substantiate these con­
cerns, we want to briefly change the focus of our analysis from a discussion of 
what else could be included, or what could be modified, to an inquiry into the 
internal coherence of MacKinnon's own thesis. Our propositioo is that although 
she does not advocate a completely negative prognosis for the condition of 
women, the positive messages which do emerge are at one and the same time 
theoretically underdeveloped and overextended To illustrate these problems we 
will focus on what MacKinnon considers to be the feminist method: conscious­
ness raising. 
To elaborate, on several occasions, as a direct and logical result of her anal­
ysis, MacKinnon asks, "What is the feminist account of how women can come 
to reject the learning portrayed as so encompassing? . . .  What accounts for some 
women's turning upon their conditioning?"149 "How can women, as created, 
'thingified in the head,' complicit in the body, see her condition as such?"1.so 
And: 
If the existing social mode l  and reality of sexuality center on male force , and if 
that sex is socially learned and ideological ly considered positive and is rewarded, 
what is swprising is that not all women eroticize dominance, not all love pornog­
raphy, and many resent rape ... the truly interesting question becomes why and 
h uali 
. . othe th hi 
. ,,ISi ow sex ty m women is ever r an masoc stic. 
We think it is important to note how MacKinnon phrases these types of ques­
tions, rhetorically, for effect. In our estimation, these questions are of much 
greater significance. They go to the very core of her theory. 1bese questions, 
1'9Supra, note 1 at 103. 
150/bid. at 124. 
mlbid. at 149. 
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that echo like a refrain throughout the book. demand that an account of women's 
agency be provided, they insist on an explanation of even the very existence of 
feminism, they problematiz.e the possibility of a text like Toward A Feminist 
Theory of the State and the emergence of a feminist academic activist like 
MacKinnon. 
MacKinnon 's answer to all of these questions is to be located in her faith 
in consciousness raising. She traces the politico-historical development of con­
sciousness raising from the coming together of women in the 1960's and 1970's, 
through the process of the collective recognition that women's powerlessness 
had been "externally imposed and deeply intemalized,"152 to its transformation 
into a "way of knowing"153 and a validational process, 154 and finally to its artic­
ulation of the possibility and necessity of social change so that women can 
become "shapers of reality as well as shaped by it. "155 
This discussion of consciousness raising goes some way towards helping 
MacKinnon explain the seemingly partial empowerment of women in the face 
of, what the rest of her analysis indicates is, an overwhelming male dominance. 
However, in our opinion. the concept of consciousness raising remains problem­
atic and insufficiently developed to carry the multifaceted and heavy weight that 
she imposes upon it: "a technique of analysis. structure of organization, method 
of practice, and theory of social change of the women's movement."156 
First, if male dominance was ever as complete as MacKinnon's theory of power 
suggests, the critical recognition which she identifies could never have taken 
place, either because men would not have allowed such gatherings of potentially 
dissident women, or the internalization would have been so deep that women 
would have had no inkling that anything was amiss. There would be no contra­
dictory consciousness waiting to be raised Second. how does MacKinnon know 
that consciousness raising is not just a dupe, another patriarchal cul de sac for 
women or what they discover there is any less socially constructed than, for 
example, the discourse of difference. 
Third, there is also something disturbingly ahistorical about the centrality 
that she accords to consciousness raising. Is MacK.innon 's suggestion that prior 
to the second wave of feminism (which, interestingly, roughly corresponds with 
her own biography) women had no technique of analysis, structure of organiza­
tion, method of practice or theory of social change? Surely this falsifies the past 
or, at the very least, fails to explain centuries long struggles by women against 
domination and for equality. To take just one example, how could MacKinnon 
152/bid. at 8. 
ts3Jbid. at 84. 
IS.Jbid. at 87. 
155/bid. at 88. 
156/bid. at 7. 
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explain that in 1958, Carribean immigrant women organized .. rap sessions" on 
"maids right out" at the YWCA in Toronto_ iST MacK.innon seems unaware that 
perhaps one of the most inspiring elements in feminist strategies of resistence 
is "the struggle of memory against forgetting. "158 
Fourth, MacKinnon portrays consciousness raising in an extremely rosy 
light, but even though this has been an important part of the recent women's 
movement, we think that she should be careful to acknowledge it has not been 
an unqualified feminist good. Power struggles have gone on within conscious­
ness raising groups, certain women have dominated and subordinated other 
women. exclusivist practices have developed. and hierarchies and orthodoxies 
have been imposed. The Psyche et Po group is one graphic example in France, 1�9 
but experience within the feminist movement more generally suggests that this 
is not an isolated incident. Male povrer, as a form of power. may be more per­
vasive than even MacKinnon be�eves and to gloss over the problem of feminist 
abuses of power with a vague and euphemistic acknowledgement that 0leader­
ship patterns often emerged"1.60 is, in her own words. to fail to take .. the realities 
of power seriously enough. "161 
Fifth, we are concerned about MacKinnon's tendency to underestimate the 
incompatibilities and limitations on solidarity within consciousness raising 
groups, an issue that echoes our earlier criticism of her ranking of sex before 
race or class. As bell hooks describes. this has significantly curtailed the poten­
tial of consciousness raising both as to the specificity of the problems and their 
possible resolution: 
li two women - one poor the other quite wealthy - might describe the process 
by which they have suffered physical abus� by male partners and find certain com­
monalities which might serve as a basis for bonding. Yet if these same two women 
engaged in a discussion of class, not only would the social construction and 
expression of femaleness differ, so too would their ideas on how to confront and 
h th · · 162 c ange eu cucumstances. 
Cumulatively, these criticisms indicate that MacKinnon •s unidimensional 
theory of power and her overemphasis on modem radical feminism drive her to 
factor in too little and. at the same time. expect too much from consciousness 
raising. Not only would a more cautious analysis of consciousness raising incor­
porate these criticisms. it might also tentatively suggest that consciousness rais-
1571'. Das Gupta, Learning From Our History: Community Development with Immigrant Women 
(Toronto: Cross Cultural Communication Centre, 1980). For further examples see, supra, note 73. 
158b. hooks, "A Call for Militant Resistance" in Yearning, supra, note 2, 1 85 al 185. 
159f'or a discussion sec, C. Duchcn, Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterand (Boston: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1986). 
160S
upra, note 1 al 85. 
161/bid. at 52. 
162b. hooks, "feminism: a transfonnational politic", supra, note 108 at  23. 
TEXT - O:\MCC.TLL\96541006 ULT FOOTNOTE - O:\MCGilL\96548006.lJl.T PAG£PROOF I 
1991 )  NOTES 605 
ing has been a mode of empowerment for women, not just in the sense that it 
has provided women with an opportunity to recognize and challenge male dom­
inance, but also because it is illustrative of a form of power distinct from the 
repressive mode. Unfortunately, once again, MacKinnon 's theory of power pre­
cludes her from accepting either of these possibilities. For example, at one point 
she opines, "Consciousness raising can also affirm that although women are 
deprived of power, within the necessity of their compliance is a form of power 
which they possess but have not yet seized. "163 As we interpret this. she seems 
to be saying that consciousness raising, though feminist method. is not feminist 
power but is simply a vehicle that can help women access that power. We find 
this frustrating because although MacKinnon comes very close to recognizing 
consciousness raising as power, she holds back. engaging us with the possibility 
of acknowledging an already existent, if imperfect, mode of power in its fem­
inist form, but in the end leaving us disappointed 
We, however, want to argue that consciousness raising even as method is, 
and has been, a form of power for women. More specifically. we contend that 
in its best moments it is an example of power in a positive light, as women, 
through a mutual support network. assist each other to recognize and resist their 
oppression, thus enabling them to claim a non-patriarchal integrity. Consider. 
for example, MacKinnon's own description of the significance of consciousness 
raising: "the collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women's social 
experience, as women live through it"164 with its "ethic of openness. honesty, 
and self-awareness. "165 Does this not sound like the ethic of care at the level of 
fem.ale praxis? 
To tie our themes together, we want to propose that if we adopt a more sub­
tle, complex, multidimensional and expansive conception of power we can 
explain the following paradox identified, but inadequately addressed, by 
MacKinnon: 
With forms of power forged from powerlessness, conditions are resisted, in the 
radical feminist view, because women somehow resent being violated and used, 
and because existing conditions deny women a whole life, visions of which are 
mea�r and partial but accessible within women's present lives and recaptured 
past:66 
By recognizing that alongside patriarchal dominance there has tenuously existed 
a feminist conception of power. power to rather than power over. we have the 
possibility of an explanation of why women have survived, how feminism as an 
antipatriarchal movement can exist, and even perhaps the inchoate rudiments of 
163Supra, note I at 101. 
164/bid. at 83. 
165/bid. at 85. 
166/bid. at 47, emphasis added. 
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what a feminist future might look like and how we might go about achieving 
it. It helps us make sense of the fact that, on occasion, the law might just 
respond to the interests of women and not those of men.167 It takes us one step 
beyond the proposition that "Feminism criticizes this male totality without an 
account of women's capacity to do so or to imagine or realize a more whole 
truth. "168 Therefore, it does not attribute too much credit to men nor too little to 
women. It does not drive us to proclaim that "there is no such thing as a woman 
as such; there are only walking embodiments of men's projected needs. "169 And 
finally, it does not consider women unremarkable, as "[p]eople who are without 
names, who do not know themselves, who have no culture."170 
IV. Critical Dialogue in the Hope of Solidarity and Subversive Spaces 
As we read through earlier drafts of this note, we realiud that, although 
we have been animated and activated by MacKinnon's theory, our analysis 
appeared disproportionately critical and unappreciative of the genuine contribu­
tion that she has made. It would be easy to write off our response as character­
istic of the logical process in an interpretational essay, for you criticize that 
which you find wanting in a particular work, and you adumbrate your, allegedly, 
improved analysis. On consideration of our present circumstances however, we 
feel that there is more to it than this. Our concerns are twofold First, the per­
sistency of our critique is, in part. a response to the tone of MacK.innon's argu­
ment. Though we have no problem with the focus of MacKinnon's challenge, 
a massive offensive on male power (hence, our title), we recoil at the pugilistic 
impulses that animate her discourse. MacKinnon's adversarial style incites siin­
ilar writing techniques in return, though we have tried to be wary of reacting too 
intensely. 
Secondly, and more substantively, the book, at times, moves beyond 
aggressive techniques and controversial content to a point where the reader, 
feminist or non-feminist, male or female, experiences the pain. We want to sug­
gest that MacKinnon is insufficiently sensitive to the thin line between the ther­
apeutic, and conceivably pro-active consequences of pain, and its paralysing 
capacity or its reactive backlash. 
For some feminists, the anguish arises from, in a sense, bearing too much 
reality. This is not to say that they are too delicate to handle the gory details, 
or that they would rather view the world through rose coloured glasses. Instead, 
167Consider, for example MacIGnnon 's own celebrated cause of action. sexual harassment which 
she argues puts "into practice the analysis argued in this book." Ibid. at 314, n.2. Sec more gen­
erally C. MacKinnon, Su:J41JI Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Su Discrimination (New 
Haven: Yale Univasity Press, 1979). 
161Toward A Feminist TMory of the State, ibid. at l l5. 
169/bid. at 1 19. 
170/bid. at F:7. 
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the lesson learned by many feminists over the last decade or so has been that 
too much negation is harmful to the cause. Feminist psychologists and women's 
health collectives have their hands full with women suffering "feminist burn­
out." In the current politico-historical conjuncture, the situation for women is 
grim and feminists know this, see this. and experience this. 1be Montreal mas­
sacre 171 is a horrific example of just bow grave the situation has become, but on 
much lesser levels, and in many ways, feminists feel the oppression. For them, 
it is impossible to live a "feminist-free" day and rune out their analyses. Every­
where you tum, from books to videos, from billboards to newspapers, from gov­
ernment officials to judges, sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism et cetera are 
apparent. Therefore, feminists must work on positive strategies, avenues of 
hope and potential. as well as continue to analyze the repressive powers at large. 
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State offers some respite, and certainly causes 
less dolor for feminists than MacKinnon's earlier work, Feminism Unm odi­
fied. 172 However, as our essay suggests, MacKinnon 's way out must be more 
clearly delineated. And, as we have also indicated, this, in itself, is not enough. 
Other sources of inspiration nrust also be tapped in order to shape a feminist 
future. 
For men, there is little doubt that MacKinnon's analyses will prove to be 
a discomforting experience. Insofar as it mainly argues that, despite their best 
intentions, men are the problem, it might well induce a dismissive and intolerant 
response. Thus, some may counter that it serves men, and all men, right if they 
suffer, considering the pain they inflict on women. But, as political realists, we 
must not forget that men still hold the reins of power and control, and thus, 
although women comprise over half of the population, to effect large-scale 
change, women cannot go it alone. Moreover, as bell hooks points out, "the 
reconstruction and transformation of male behaviour, of masculinity, is a neces­
sary and essential part of feminist revolution."173 Thus, after speaking out on 
their own, it is important for feminists to strike up a conversation with men. 
This dialogue is necessary, but becomes difficult, if not impossible, when both 
sides are hurting. A political morality of care may provide the f mm elation for 
such a conversation. A starting point might be a discussion of the ways in which 
male sexuality is also socially constructed (something which MacKinnon does 
not even avert to) and therefore potentially open to reconstruction in a less dom­
inating form. 
1710n the 6th of December, 1989, Marc Lepine entered the F.nginecring Faculty (the Ecole Poly­
technique) of the Univcrsite de Montreal and slaughtered fourteen women students after calling 
them •·a bWlCh of feminists." 
172C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987). 
173"fcminist focus on men: a comment" in Talking Back, supra, note 59, 127 at 127. 
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What we have offered in this essay is not a trashing job on MacKinnon 
from without, but an internal critique that embraces the spirit, if not always the 
specifics or modus operandi, of MacKinnon's enterprise_ As a feminist and a 
sympathetic male, we have both experienced the pain of this book. but also have 
managed to move beyond it to talk about it. This, in tum, has enabled us to rec­
ognize and articulate perhaps our most fundamental disagreement with 
MacKinnon which is that she does not identify that there is, and must be, more 
than one way out. 
MacKinnon has gone a long way in developing a feminist theory of state 
and law, but, maddeningly, she throws so much away because of the monolithi­
cal and dismissive mode of analysis. It is particularly frustrating given that fem­
inism, and feminist theory, through its appreciation of gender difference, has 
taken difference to heart and has consciously determined to keep itself open to 
multiplicity. This is not the same as liberal phrralism, and it does not result in 
an "anything feminist goes" mentality. Rather, it represents a positive step away 
from the authoritarianism, the pursuit of "truth," and the tidy closure of males-. 
tream thought. It acknowledges the possibility that some analyses may be mis­
taken and it accepts and encourages disagreement. As the opening paragraph of 
Part I of this note indicates, MacKinnon 's primary emphasis is on the "is" of 
male power. Consequently, we feel, that she underdevelops a feminist recon­
structive programme. We believe you cannot adequately deconstruct the present 
without some conception, even if it is corrigible, as to where we want to go and 
how we might get there. This requires the articulation of an "ought." the adum­
bration of a feminist political morality. And, given the formidable nature of the 
task. we have argued that "ought" must include more than one viewpoint, more 
than one right answer. MacKinnon, however, refuses to accept such diversity. 
Therefore, we suggest that, in spite of the substance of the book which aspires 
to providing the feminist theory of the state, the title more accurately captures 
MacKinnon's contribution: a progression toward formulating such a theory. 
